






THE MERE MIRAGE OF A CLASS ACTION?A CHALLENGE TO MERRICKS v MASTERCARD





It has not been the most auspicious start for the UK’s first opt-out class action regime. Neither of the first two collective proceedings (as the regime, principally embodied in the Competition Act 1998, terms them​[1]​) has made it past certification — and there have only been the two claims filed at the time of writing. Its commencement has been something of a ‘slow-burner’, as potentially suitable cases are identified for litigation by both law firms and third party funders.​[2]​ 

	Whilst the Competition Act regime (the ‘CA regime’) caters for both stand-alone and follow-on actions arising from competition law grievances,​[3]​ it is the latter type to which litigious attention has been directed to date. The Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), in which exclusive jurisdiction is vested,​[4]​ has been confronted with two quite different follow-on collective actions, against which to test the legislative phraseology and ethos of this new procedural tool.

	The first collective proceeding filed, that of Gibson v Pride Mobility Products Ltd (‘Mobility Scooters’),​[5]​ concerned proven infringements against the defendant constituting resale price maintenance of certain models of mobility scooters. The class action was withdrawn,​[6]​ shortly after the CAT declined to certify it unless substantial amendments were made to the pleadings. The withdrawal was subject to the representative claimant’s agreeing to pay adverse costs of almost £310,000.​[7]​ 

	The second action, that of Merricks v Mastercard Inc (‘Mastercard’),​[8]​ failed outright at certification. An application for special leave to the Court of Appeal was thereafter rejected by the CAT,​[9]​ on two bases: (1) that there was no jurisdiction conferred by the CA regime to permit any appeal to the Court of Appeal;​[10]​ and (2) that, even had such jurisdiction existed, the CAT did not consider that the case ‘would have any real prospects of success’ on appeal.​[11]​ At the time of writing, a ‘rolled-up appeal’​[12]​ has been filed by the representative claimant, applying directly to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal, and to the Administrative Court for judicial review of the CAT’s refusal to certify.​[13]​ A significant interim adverse costs award against that claimant has also been ordered by the CAT.​[14]​ What happens next in the Mastercard action is crucial, given that other high-profile class actions are reportedly waiting in the wings.​[15]​

	The Mobility Scooters decision set an important and landmark point of precedent for the UK’s fledgling opt-out class action — viz, that any follow-on class action must relate to the actual infringement decision upon which the follow-on action was based. In other words, a finding of specific infringements by Pride Mobility Scooters in respect of particular models sold by particular retailers could not found a class action which was ostensibly based upon an allegation of a market-wide ‘policy’ of infringing conduct by that defendant involving all models sold by all retailers. Otherwise, grave injustice could be done. For example, limitation periods could be avoided, and damages could be awarded against a retailer who had not been the subject of any infringement decision at all.​[16]​ 

	However, Mastercard is of a different ilk. This second certification decision contains several points of principle which threaten to undermine, and derail, the object and purposes of the CA regime. Certification failed because the claims were ‘not suitable to be brought in collective proceedings’, under s 47B(6) of the Competition Act 1998. Essentially, there were two reasons for this. First, no sustainable methodology could be applied in practice to calculate aggregate damages across the defined class of victims of the price-fixing implemented by Mastercard.​[17]​ Secondly, there was no reasonable or practicable means of estimating the individual loss per class member to enable any aggregate damages to be distributed to the class members.​[18]​ Should these two grounds of refusal, and the reasoning underpinning them, remain unchallenged and unrefuted, several future collective claims may struggle to achieve certification.

	The importance of this decision cannot be overstated — dealing, as it does, with certification, and so early in the life of the new UK regime. Certification is, as one US commentator describes, a truly ‘pivotal moment in class actions litigation’, often determining whether the action thereafter continues to trial, settles or simply vanishes.​[19]​ The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, of the extensive class actions US jurisprudence, that ‘irrespective of the merits, certification decisions may have a decisive effect on litigation’.​[20]​ Canadian courts agree that the ‘gatekeeping role’ of the certification application is a ‘battleground’,​[21]​ and that, ‘in some senses, the certification proceeding is the trial’.​[22]​  

	In that light, the purposes of this article are four-fold.​[23]​ First, the political and reformist aims of the CA regime are worth restating, particularly in light of certain comments made by the CAT in Mastercard. These are considered in Section C. Secondly, the authors contend, in Section D, that a feasible aggregate assessment of damages was proposed in Mastercard, having regard to comparative class actions jurisprudence primarily from Canada,​[24]​ and with some appropriate reference to the United States,​[25]​ and that a correctly-applied evidentiary standard would have yielded quite a different result. Thirdly, the position is argued, in Section E, that a lawful and proper distribution of damages to individual class members, or to others, was entirely achievable in Mastercard, and that such a distribution methodology should have rendered these proceedings suitable to bring as collective proceedings. Again, this analysis is undertaken by reference to relevant comparative North American jurisprudence of persuasive effect. Section F examines the refusal of the CAT to permit any appeal by the representative claimant, and argues that this refusal conflicts with historical trends elsewhere, contravenes the express wording of the CA regime itself, and infringes relevant constitutional principles. Section G concludes. 

	Notably, there is no reference to US case law at all in Mastercard, regarding aggregate damages or distribution. The CAT remarked that the Canadian class actions regimes are ‘closer to the new UK regime than are the rules in the United States’​[26]​ — an observation which reflects its sentiments, in Mobility Scooters, that ‘more appropriate guidance [on certification] can be derived from the position in Canada, where almost all the provinces have had a class action procedure for at least a decade (in Ontario since 1993) and the character of certification applications does not assume the pattern prevailing in the United States’.​[27]​ However, on the subjects of aggregate assessment, and distribution, of class actions damages — and their appropriate treatment in a certification hearing — the authors consider that both Canadian and US jurisprudence have many useful insights and lessons to offer, especially for a class action of the type launched against Mastercard. Drawing upon these, this article explores the various ‘rebuttal points’ which arguably would be of much relevance and utility, given that Mastercard is due to proceed for further judicial consideration.​[28]​

	First, though, it is necessary, in Section B, to summarise Mastercard, so as to set the context for the analysis which follows.

B.   	The Mastercard decision

By any measure, the action commenced by Walter Merricks CBE, the proposed representative claimant, against Mastercard was a large one.​[29]​ The class included approximately 46.2 million people;​[30]​ the damages sought were in the region of £14 billion;​[31]​ and the class period covered some 16 years, from 1992–2008.​[32]​ The costs and expenses of the action were funded, in part, by third party funder Gerchen Keller Capital LLC.​[33]​

	The infringement decision against three Mastercard entities, upon which this class action was founded, was delivered by the European Commission (EC) on 19 December 2007, with appeals against that decision dismissed in 2012 and 2014. Essentially, the class action sought to recover losses incurred by consumers as a result of interchange fees which were imposed by Mastercard on transactions that took place from 1992–2008, whereby those interchange fees were held to be anti-competitive, contrary to Art 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The EC found that, absent that price-fixing, the interchange fees set by Mastercard and charged between banks for cross-border transactions, and for many domestic transactions, would have been lower. 

	As ancillary matters on certification: the proposed representative, Mr Merricks, was held to be entirely suitable to act as representative claimant,​[34]​ as required by the CA regime;​[35]​ and the phrase, ‘the costs or expenses incurred by the representative in connection with the proceedings’ in s 47C(6) properly covered a third party funder’s success fee, thereby allowing that fee to be paid out of any unclaimed damages sum.​[36]​ The latter, in particular, is an important point of precedent which, in the authors’ view,​[37]​ entirely accords with what Parliament intended when inserting that amending provision, and which will give comfort to funders in future cases.

1. 	Aggregate assessment of the damages for the class affected by Mastercard’s price-fixing

One of the matters which the CAT must address when deciding whether or not the claims are suitable to be brought as collective proceedings is ‘whether the claims are suitable for an aggregate award of damages’,​[38]​ i.e., whether a computation of the global loss suffered by the consumer class over the infringement period was possible. Predictably, the representative claimant submitted that it was, and the defendant contended that it was not. The classic ‘battle-lines’ were drawn. 

(a)	The representative claimant’s approach

On the one hand, the CAT described the proposal of Mr Merricks to calculate aggregate damages as a ‘top-down approach’ to the calculation of the global overcharge.​[39]​ This aggregate loss was to be based on three components: (1) the volume of commerce (VoC) affected; (2) the overcharge percentages; and (3) the extent of the pass-through to consumers.​[40]​ 

	It was proposed to multiply the VoC (for domestic purchases and cross-border purchases) by the overcharge percentages (with different multipliers for cross-border transactions and intra-UK transactions, and calculated separately for debit cards and credit cards). The extent to which the overcharge was passed on to the consumer class members was dealt with on two bases. It was accepted that the banks would have passed through all the overcharge to the retailers (‘the first stage’). But the extent of the pass-through from retailers to individual customers (‘the second stage’), via increased retail prices, was more ‘challenging’.​[41]​ If the rates at which the overcharge was passed on were ultimately found to have differed for different sectors of the UK economy, then a weighted average pass-through rate would need to be applied. That weighted average would reflect the different levels of pass-through in different sectors or markets, and the proportion which card expenditure in those respective sectors or markets bore to the total.​[42]​ It was accepted that a more detailed breakdown of card expenditure by markets was available for the final four years of the infringement period, 2005–8, but the experts had not established whether any greater detail of pass-through rates was available for earlier years, at the stage of the certification hearing.​[43]​ 

	In response to this proposed methodology for calculating the global overcharge for the consumer class, the CAT acknowledged that ‘in theory, calculation of global loss through a weighted-average pass-through ... is methodologically sound’.​[44]​ However, this methodology was ‘a hugely complex exercise requiring access to a wide range of data’ — and, of the types of data mentioned, the CAT appeared to give most credence to published data on the passing on of input costs and on credit and debit card usage, rather than requesting disclosure of such evidence from third parties, or relying on the pass-through rates which had been proven in other litigation against Mastercard.​[45]​ Whilst the calculation of aggregate damages did not have to be done for certification, said the CAT, it declared that ‘a proper effort would have had to be made to determine whether it is practicable by ascertaining what data is reasonably available’, and that this data was not provided at certification to support a viable methodology.​[46]​ 

	In other words, it was the lack of data to establish the different levels of pass-through in different sectors or markets, and the proportion which that card expenditure in those respective sectors or markets bore to the total volume of commerce during the infringement period, which meant that (in the CAT’s view) no weighted average pass-through percentage was possible to calculate. As a result (concluded the CAT), no aggregate damages assessment was possible via the ‘top-down approach’.​[47]​





By contrast, the defendant proposed a ‘bottom-up approach’ to damages calculation. In other words, ‘it was necessary to start by considering the individual losses of the claimants and how that might sensibly be aggregated’.​[50]​ Mastercard submitted that the representative claimant had approached the computation of damage ‘the wrong way round’, and that it was incorrect to ‘seek to establish the total overcharge paid by everyone in the country in aggregate, to produce a pot of money which it would then proceed to share out in a way that bore no relation to individual loss.’​[51]​ Mastercard emphasised the different individual losses that consumers would have suffered, by pointing to variations in (i) the pass-through rates of various merchants whom they purchased from, (ii) the different purchasing history from one consumer to another, and (iii) certain benefits (e.g., loyalty cash-back schemes) of which some individual cardholders may have been able to take advantage.​[52]​

	The CAT agreed with Mastercard’s submission that it was necessary to aggregate the class members’ individual losses, rather than by calculating class-wide damages via the top-down approach — but that the individual losses per class member would vary to such an extent that it would not be possible to adopt that ‘bottom-up approach’. Those individual losses would be so variable across the 46 million class members that it would be an impossible task to calculate. The CAT concluded that ‘the level of individual spend [per class member, due to the price-fixed fees] is manifestly not a common issue’.​[53]​ Hence, it was not possible to multiply an average loss-per-class-member by 46 million to arrive at the global sum of damages sustained during the infringement period.

	This left Mr Merricks between two stools. Neither the top-down nor the bottom-up approach was achievable, by way of aggregating damages.  
	
2. 	Distributing the damages to the class members

The second basis for denying certification related to the distribution of that aggregate award, i.e., its allocation among the class members.

	There had to be ‘a reasonable and practicable means of getting back to the calculation of individual compensation’.​[54]​ If damages were aggregated on a class-wide basis and then distributed to individual class members, then (said the CAT) the case had to satisfy ‘the governing principle of damages for breach of competition law, [viz] restoration of the claimants to the position they would have been in but for the breach’.​[55]​ That was the ‘compensatory principle’ in action. 

	Mr Merricks suggested this formula for distribution​[56]​ — the relevant part in bold: 

an annualised distribution to all class members for the years that they are in the class, i.e., the aggregate loss would be calculated on an annual basis for each of the 16 years in the claims period, and be divided on an equal, per capita basis among all the members of the class for that year (effectively, all who were resident in the UK and >16 in that year).

	However, said the CAT, that proposed per-capita-distribution-on-an-annualised-basis ‘bore no relationship to the individual loss’.​[57]​ The amount per class member arrived at via that computation would be too inaccurate — ‘there is no plausible way of reaching even a very rough-and-ready approximation of the loss suffered by each individual claimant from the aggregate loss’.​[58]​ Essentially, the same reasons as to why a ‘bottom up’ approach to aggregate damages could not be used were equally applicable when it came to the conundrum of how to distribute the aggregate damages pot. Different spending patterns among the consumers with different retailers or in different sectors, benefits accruing to some of them due to cashback loyalty programmes, and differing rates of pass-through among the retailers to their consumers, meant that loss-per-class-member would be different.

	Most significantly, dividing the aggregate sum on an equal, per capita, basis would not meet the compensatory principle, because class members would be allocated an amount from the damages pot which did not necessarily relate to the loss they had in fact suffered. That was fatal to the claim, and meant that the claim was not ‘suitable’ to proceed as a class action.

	Before turning to an analytical critique of these two reasons, it is interesting and relevant to revisit why the CA regime was enacted in 2015.

C.	The aims of the new regime, revisited

1.	Changing the landscape 

One particular passage stands out from the Mastercard judgment, above all others. In response to the representative claimant’s submission that it would be ‘totally impractical’ for the consumer class members to sue to recover their losses individually if certification failed, the CAT remarked: ‘that is effectively the position in most cases of widespread consumer loss resulting from competition law infringements. It does not mean that an application to bring collective proceedings in such a case must always be granted’ (the ‘CAT Statement’).​[59]​

	Of course, that is the very point of certification — a ‘gateway’ of stringent statutory criteria which a class’s claim must negotiate, and which the representative claimant must demonstrate. The Department which sponsored the UK reforms (BIS) noted that ‘strong safeguards would be needed as part of an opt-out regime’, one of which must be certification.​[60]​ English reformers were certainly not attracted to the lack of formal certification which characterises the Australian federal class action. Preceding law reform opinion had recommended against certification for that Australian regime;​[61]​ and as one of its drafters recently recalls, ‘[i]n the interests of saving unnecessary work, and therefore expense, it seemed obvious that ... we should dispense with the American certification process, in favour of allowing a respondent, who wished to challenge the applicability of the class action procedure, to move for a dismissal or stay of the proceedings.’​[62]​ The English law reformers did not accept the ethos of those sentiments — and those who drafted the UK legislation and the supporting court rules duly produced a lengthy certification matrix.​[63]​ As interpreters and ‘gate-keepers’ of the words and phraseology contained in that matrix, the CAT Statement demonstrates a clear appreciation of the filtering function which the Government intended certification to serve under the CA regime. 

	However, the Tribunal’s position, that nothing better is possible in many cases than unredressed consumer grievances and undistributed profits accruing to cartellists arising from lucrative and unlawful anti-competitive conduct, is contentious. It seemingly flies in the face of the laudable Governmental aims when enacting this opt-out regime. It was, resoundingly, not the Government’s intention that such an arid and inhospitable landscape should continue to prevail for UK consumers.

	This is evidenced in two respects: by the Government’s Response prior to the regime being promulgated; and from the Parliamentary debates surrounding the Consumer Rights Bill 2014–15, to which the opt-out regime was scheduled. Revisiting these illustrates the uneasy juxtaposition now arising between the CAT’s judicial reserve and the earlier Governmental aspirations. 

(a)	The preceding Governmental statement

The BIS Department developed a consultation paper for class actions in the competition law field in 2012.​[64]​ The Government published its formal response to that consultation in January 2013.​[65]​ That document contained the following comments — made particularly with consumer redress in mind:

$	‘it is very clear that the current system of collective redress does not work. Consumers are not currently getting redress for breaches of competition law. It appears unlikely that simply tinkering with the opt-in system would deliver the desired access to justice ... It is also clear that … there are some cases that could only ever be brought on an opt-out basis in practice’;​[66]​

$	‘the fundamental premise of the Government’s policy [is] to empower consumers and businesses to challenge anti-competitive behaviour, and facilitate their fundamental right to seek redress for themselves for damages that they have suffered’;​[67]​

$	‘The Government recognises that opt-out collective actions are novel, which is why the actions are limited to competition cases — where many claims, particularly those brought on behalf of consumers, cannot be effectively brought in any other way’.​[68]​





Turning one’s attention to the Parliamentary chamber, the Consumer Rights Bill was introduced to the Commons as a legislative initiative of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition, on 23 January 2014.​[71]​ The following Hansard statements are particularly notable: 

$	during its Second Reading in the Commons, the Secretary of State who presented the Bill, the Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable MP, remarked that, ‘consumers rarely get redress when they have been harmed by anti-competitive behaviour. In 10 years, there has been only one collective action case in this country, and only 0.1% of the consumers who were eligible signed up to it’;​[72]​  

$	during the Bill’s Second Reading in the Lords, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for BIS, Viscount Younger, called it ‘the most fundamental reform of UK consumer law for more than a generation. It will streamline the law, and make it clearer and more accessible. It will enhance consumer rights ... It will empower consumers and stimulate competition and growth’;​[73]​  

$	in the Public Bills committee, Baroness Neville-Rolfe stated that, ‘the Government believes that the present opt-in regime is ... not delivering effective redress. We therefore propose in the Bill to introduce an opt-out regime with safeguards’;​[74]​ and that the Bill ‘does not just introduce an opt-out collective actions regime. It reforms the entire private actions regime for the benefit of both businesses and consumers. I think we are all agreed that consumers come first here.’​[75]​

	Whilst the abovementioned comments by Dr Cable refer to the ill-fated opt-in action by Which? (the English Consumers’ Association) against JJB Sports plc which was pursued under the now-repealed s 47B of the Competition Act 1998,​[76]​ that was not the only case of interest. After British Airways and Virgin admitted price-fixing fuel surcharges on long-haul flights between August 2004 and March 2006 — and in the absence of any opt-out action available in England under which they could proceed — UK residents had to resort to forming one of the settlement classes in the relevant US litigation.​[77]​ An attempt to use the representative rule​[78]​ on behalf of a class of retailers who were affected by this same cartel failed, on the basis that the flower importer representative claimant and class members did not share the ‘same interest’ which that rule required.​[79]​ Another scenario of interest was that, during 2002–3, certain supermarkets and dairy processors colluded to fix the price of milk, dairy and cheese products. The sizable profits made by the defendants (reportedly £270 million​[80]​) vastly exceeded the fines levied by the OFT (£116 million) — but a proposed follow-on action on opt-in principles was ultimately not pursued due to funding difficulties.​[81]​

	Hence, the essence of the CA regime — as the Government Response and Hansard comments aptly demonstrate — was to change this under-utilised and largely-ineffective landscape of private law enforcement. It was not to carry forward the status quo, which the CAT Statement (and the result in Mastercard) seem to perpetuate. 

2.	The purposive interpretation adopted elsewhere

To reiterate, Mastercard is only the second certification decision handed down under the CA regime. These are embryonic stages of an entirely new procedure — and on that point too, the CAT Statement stands in stark contrast to some of the early decisions under the Canadian and US regimes. 

	In one of the first Canadian class action cases to go to the Supreme Court — that of Hollick v Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality)​[82]​ — that Court urged that the then-new Canadian class proceedings legislation should be construed generously, and not narrowly, to give life to the statute’s purpose, viz, to encourage judicial economy and access to justice, and to modify the behaviour of wrongdoers. The Supreme Court remarked that it was ‘essential ... that courts not take an overly restrictive approach to the legislation, but rather interpret the Act in a way that gives full effect to the benefits foreseen by the drafters ... [and] it is particularly important to keep this principle in mind at the certification stage’.​[83]​ A differently-constituted Canadian Supreme Court also advocated the need for a ‘liberal and flexible’ approach to certification.​[84]​ Most recently of all, in Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd v Microsoft Corp,​[85]​ the Canadian Supreme Court cautioned against a too-onerous analysis at certification: ‘the Canadian approach at the certification stage does not allow for an extensive assessment of the complexities and challenges that a plaintiff may face in establishing its case at trial. After an action has been certified, additional information may come to light calling into question whether the requirements of [the certification criteria in s 4(1)] continue to be met. It is for this reason that enshrined in the Class Proceedings Act is the power of the court to decertify the action if, at any time, it is found that the conditions for certification are no longer met.’

	In the so-called ‘home of the class action’, antitrust class actions have a long and rich history of testing the limits of what the FRCP will permit. Recently, it has been said that ‘class practitioners have seen their cases — from class certifications to settlement approvals — become more difficult to maintain and manage’,​[86]​ albeit that the use of aggregate damages based upon a ‘before and after’ damages model is now commonplace in antitrust cases,​[87]​ and that such actions are now frequently the subject of rather vaguely-handled ‘renewed’ applications for certification if the initial certification application fails to meet the FRCP 23 criteria.​[88]​ However, it is striking how two cases, 40 years apart, distinctly resonate with the tribulations currently being thrown up by the Mastercard decision. How prescient were the words of the US District Court in 1977, when it stated, in Shelter Realty Corp v Allied Maintenance Corp,​[89]​ that the defendants: 

contend that the question of damages will require individualized proof by absent class members, and that this is in itself sufficient to preclude class treatment. ... But the conclusion outruns the premise. If [that] argument were uncritically accepted, there would be little if any place for the class action device in the adjudication of antitrust claims. Such a result should not be and has not been readily embraced by the various courts confronted with the same argument.

	Recently, in Kleen Products LLC v Intl Paper Co,​[90]​ the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified a price-fixing class action brought by direct purchases against various producers and sellers of containerboard. As in Mastercard, the defendants submitted that aggregate assessment of damages was not possible, and if it were, that individualised proof of damages per class member was too burdensome; and secondly, the defendant’s experts disagreed with the methodology which the class representative’s expert had used to estimate damages on a class-wide basis. The Court remarked that the representative claimants ‘are permitted to use estimates and analysis to calculate a reasonable approximation of their damages. And ... at the class certification stage, plaintiffs are not obliged to drill down and estimate each individual class member’s damages. The determination of the aggregate class-wide damages is something that can be handled most efficiently as a class action, and the allocation of that total sum among the class members can be managed individually’.​[91]​





It will be recalled that the CAT refused certification because the claims were not suitable to be brought in collective proceedings, as required by s 47B(6) of the Competition Act 1998. 

	As a statutory interpretation point — CAT r 79 provides that, ‘[i]n determining whether the claims are suitable to be brought in collective proceedings ... the Tribunal shall take into account all matters it thinks fit, including’ a designated list of matters. Notably, the rule is expressed in mandatory terms — the Tribunal shall take the listed matters into account. One of these is ‘whether the claims are suitable for an aggregate award of damages’​[92]​ (and the CAT concluded they were not); and another mandatory factor to consider is ‘the availability ... of any other means of resolving the dispute’.​[93]​ Re this latter factor, the CAT Statement appears to accept that there will be no other means for individual consumers to recover the loss caused to them by the price-fixing of the interchange fee. 

	Of course, it is a matter of judgment that not all factors itemised in the statutory list will point in the same direction — suitable, or otherwise. But the fact that all must be taken into account, explicitly, suggests that a more detailed assessment of those factors — including the legal effect of where other redress mechanisms are unavailable to these consumers — should have been undertaken in the Mastercard judgment. Arguably, it was a contentious point of law that it did not do so. The point was made recently by the British Columbia Court of Appeal, in Sherry v CIBC Mortgages Inc,​[94]​ that ‘an appellate court must defer to a conclusion reached [on the certification criteria of BC’s statute] under s 4(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act, in the absence of an error of law or principle, or the failure of the judge below to consider or weigh all relevant factors’. 

	This is especially the case, when the assessment of damages suffered by each class member in price-fixing cases is challenging, precisely because such cases often involve relatively small injuries to a relatively large number of people, over varying periods, and involving more than one product. The Mastercard case calls to mind the comments by Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, when dealing with the superiority criterion in a consumer class action: ‘[t]he realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30. But a class action has to be unwieldy indeed before it can be pronounced an inferior alternative ... to no litigation at all.’​[95]​

	It is appropriate now to turn attention to the two substantive problems as to why the action instituted by Mr Merricks was held to be ‘unsuitable’ as collective proceedings: aggregating class-wide damages; and distributing those damages. 

D.	The first ‘problem’: aggregating the damages

1.	The aggregate assessment provision was not given explicit effect to

It will be recalled that the representative claimant proposed to assess the consumer class’s aggregate damages by the following equation: the VoC, multiplied by the overcharge percentage, multiplied by the average weighted pass-through of the overcharge to consumers. It utilised a ‘top down’ approach. When discussing the problem of distributing the damages to class members as a ‘fundamental problem’, the CAT stated that, ‘it is largely because of the methodology of seeking to calculate the loss on a top-down, aggregate basis, and not on the basis of a common issue concerning loss suffered by each member (or most members) of the class, that the fundamental problem arises’.​[96]​ That point was reiterated by the CAT in the rejection of leave to appeal too.​[97]​ 

	However, legally speaking, there is absolutely no requirement that aggregate damages be assessed on the basis of calculating the loss suffered by each class member as a common issue. Quite the reverse. Aggregate damages are expressly permitted by s 47C(2) of the Competition Act 1998 without reference to the individual losses of the class members (whether common or variable) at all:​[98]​ 

The Tribunal may make an award of damages in collective proceedings without undertaking an assessment of the amount of damages recoverable in respect of the claim of each represented person.

Having cited this provision,​[99]​ the CAT did not then explicitly explore its effect in any detail. However, the section appears to be extremely important. Arguably, it should have borne real significance in Mastercard in two respects.

	First, any suggestion that Mr Merricks should be required to propose a methodology for the assessment of individual-loss-per-class-member at certification stage is entirely incompatible with the language of the section. The computation of aggregate damages takes place prior to any distribution of the judgment sum being undertaken. Indeed, whilst the computation of aggregate damages is most certainly an adversarial process in which the defendant will be heavily involved, the allocation of the aggregate sum amongst class members almost never is (as discussed later in the article​[100]​). The CAT’s own Guide to Proceedings 2015 — which has the status of a Practice Direction under the CAT Rules​[101]​ — remarks that an aggregate assessment of damages under s 47C(2) ‘is designed to be a practical and proportionate method of assessing damages in collective proceedings’ and ‘is likely to be more suitable where its calculation can be made without information from the class members, such as where the defendant’s records are sufficient’.​[102]​ Mr Merricks was proposing that the data necessary to compute aggregate damages be sourced from published data and other sources — just the sort of territory which the Guide foreshadows to trigger the operation of s 47C(2). Whether there was a reasonably accurate basis to support that methodology — consistent with the Pro-Sys test — is a question of an entirely different order, discussed shortly. However, this case surely required a closer analysis of s 47C(2)’s wording and intent than actually occurred.

	Secondly, regarding s 47C(2), Canadian precedent is very instructive. Ontario’s class actions statute,​[103]​ together with the other provincial statutes,​[104]​ contains a very similar term, viz, that:

The court may determine the aggregate or a part of a defendant's liability to class members and give judgment accordingly where ... 

(c)	the aggregate or a part of the defendant’s liability to some or all class members can reasonably be determined without proof by individual class members.

Of this provision, Canadian courts have been emphatic, e.g.: 

$	‘an aggregate assessment is not the tallying of the individual class members' claims. Rather, it is a communal assessment of the totality of the class members' claims where the underlying facts permit this to be done with reasonable accuracy’ (per Fantl v Transamerica Life Canada​[105]​); 

$	establishing a bank’s liability for imposing unauthorised fees, for example, ‘does not require making individual inquiries of cardholders to determine what they would have done if they had known of the fees’ — in that case, the aggregate of the bank’s liability ‘may reasonably be expected to be capable of proof by resort to [the bank’s] records of the amount of fee income it collected during the relevant time frame’ (per Cassano v Toronto-Dominion Bank​[106]​); 

$  	all that is necessary at certification is that the representative claimant establish that there is ‘some basis in fact to establish that aggregate damages can reasonably be determined without proof by individual class members’ — it is for the trial judge to then determine what that sum may be, once all the evidence on that point has been adduced (per Bozsik v Livingston Intl Inc​[107]​); and 

$ 	a class action ‘optimizes every party’s investment in their claim or defence, which is prepared and presented once’, and that ‘the court’s ability to award aggregate damages’ is a statutory device that ‘further optimize[s] the utility of the common issues trial’ (per Das v George Weston Ltd​[108]​).

Hence, three crucial points that can be taken from these passages, for the purposes of the Mastercard judgment, are that: (1) a communal assessment of damages is preferable, if there is some basis in fact to support it; (2) the key to aggregate assessment is where external information is available to compute those damages; and (3) it is not for the representative claimant to compute that aggregate sum, or to have all the evidence necessary to do so, at certification — that will be the trial judge’s task to assess at the trial proper. Hence, there was no ‘fundamental problem’ in proposing the equation for aggregate damages which the representative claimant did. Rather, the more relevant legal questions were whether it would yield an answer with the requisite degree of accuracy, and whether there was a ‘basis in fact’ to support the methodology and equation being proposed. Dealing with those in turn: 

2.	The degree of accuracy required for the aggregate assessment should not adhere to that required for individual litigation

As outlined earlier, the CAT was concerned that the amount of the pass-through, even if weighted by reference to different sectors or markets, may not reflect the actual pass-through which occurred throughout the UK economy during the infringement period. It may not lead to a wholly accurate aggregate figure. 

	A legally relevant question here, which was not explicitly explored in the Mastercard judgment, is this: what degree of accuracy is required for an aggregate assessment? Does the aggregate assessment need to precisely match what Mastercard’s liability would have been, had 46 million claimants filed their individual proceedings? Neither s 47C(2) nor the Ontario and equivalent Canadian legislatures answer this question explicitly. However, over the course of 25 years of jurisprudence, the question has been resolutely answered in Canadian case law in the negative: 

$	by virtue of s 24(1)(c), ‘[t]he same degree of accuracy as in an ordinary action is not required. Therefore, the aggregate damages methodology will be reasonable if some members of the class are over-compensated and some are under-compensated, as long as the defendant’s total liability is not over-stated’ (per Ramdath v George Brown College of Applied Arts and Technology​[109]​); 

$	‘it appears to me that the intent of the legislature [in s 24(1)(c)] was to adopt a liberalized version of the recommendation of the [Ontario] Law Reform Commission as to the accuracy of the aggregate assessment of the defendant’s liability. The legislature’s version is more liberal than the Commission’s recommendation because “reasonably be determined” seems to be more flexible and generous [than the OLRC’s drafting]’ (per McCracken v Canadian National Rwy Co​[110]​); 

$	‘the ultimate criterion for the availability of an aggregate damage award is ... not whether the defendant’s liability can be assessed with the same degree of accuracy as in an individual action. ... [it depends on three factors drawn from Ramdath​[111]​]: whether the non-individualized evidence presented by the defendants is sufficiently reliable; whether use of evidence will result in unfairness or injustice to the defendant, such as overstatement of its liability; and whether the denial of aggregate approach will result in a ‘wrong eluding an effective remedy’ and a denial of access to justice’ (per Cantlie v Canadian Heating Products Inc​[112]​).

It is submitted that a similar legal construction should be adopted for s 47C(2) of the CA regime — that an aggregate assessment of reasonable accuracy is the appropriate test. Furthermore, the Ramdath factors should carry equal resonance for the CAT as they did for that Ontario Court of Appeal. Hence, even if the weighted average would not precisely capture the differing pass-through rates across different sectors of the UK economy for each of the 16 years of the infringement period, a reasonably accurate calculation is sufficient. 

	This leads to the next point of relevance — whether the data assembled by Mr Merricks’ experts provided a sufficient evidentiary basis to substantiate an aggregate damages award.





In the authors’ view (and assuming that class-wide compensatory damages is the appropriate measure of damages in an opt-out competition law class action​[113]​), the CAT’s adoption of the test prescribed by the Canadian Supreme Court in Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd v Microsoft Corp — that ‘the methodology must offer a realistic prospect of establishing loss on a class-wide basis ...[it] cannot be purely theoretical or hypothetical, but must be grounded in the facts of the particular case in question. There must be some evidence of the availability of the data to which the methodology is to be applied’​[114]​ — is the correct standard to apply under the CA regime. 

	However, it is arguable that the test was mis-applied in Mastercard, and that the representative claimant did indeed meet the Pro-Sys threshold. This view is explained by reference to particularly relevant Canadian cases in which the Pro-Sys standard was applied. This case law strongly suggests that Mastercard would have been certified in Canada, on the basis of the evidence and methodology provided to the CAT for the certification hearing. As some academic commentators have remarked, the Pro-Sys standard means that ‘Canada is increasingly being considered a class action “friendly” jurisdiction’​[115]​ — a view quite inimical to the CAT’s approach in Mastercard.

	A further key passage from the Pro-Sys judgment, which was not cited by the CAT but which was quite significant, was this: 

It is not necessary at the certification stage that the methodology establish the actual loss to the class, as long as the plaintiff has demonstrated that there is a methodology capable of doing so. In [end consumer] indirect purchaser actions, this means that the methodology must be able to establish that the overcharges have been passed on to the indirect-purchaser level in the distribution chain.​[116]​

	Notably, the certification judge’s decision​[117]​ that the representative claimant’s experts had proposed a plausible methodology for showing that the overcharges by Microsoft were passed through to the indirect purchasers was restored by the Supreme Court in Pro-Sys. Significantly, whilst the methodology proposed by one of the experts (a ‘price premium method’) was accepted by the Supreme Court as being ‘a plausible methodology for proving class-wide loss’, it was also accepted, for the purposes of certification, that ‘[i]mplicit in this evidence is that the data necessary to apply the methodologies in Canada is available.’​[118]​ In other words, the representative claimant did not have to bring that data set to the certification hearing. Rothstein J noted that it was for the trial judge to receive, weigh and examine that data: 

It is indeed possible that at trial the expert evidence presented by Microsoft will prove to be stronger and more credible than the evidence of [the representative claimant’s experts]. However, resolving conflicts between the experts is an issue for the trial judge and not one that should be engaged in at certification ... The trial judge will have the benefit of a full record upon which to assess the appropriateness of any damages award that may be made pursuant to the proposed methodology.’​[119]​

Relying on the outcome of Pro-Sys alone gives cause to be concerned that the CAT applied too high an evidentiary standard in Merricks v Mastercard. This view is only strengthened, when one has regard to the relevant case law that has been handed down in Canada since then. 

(b)	Application of the Pro-Sys standard by Canadian courts: relevant cases

It is striking that, in the various cases brought by indirect purchasers against alleged or proven cartellists in Canada since Pro-Sys was delivered by the Canadian Supreme Court, there has always been a dispute between the opponents in the litigation as to whether there was a valid methodology by which to prove loss on a class-wide basis. Notably, whether or not the methodology met the requisite evidentiary standard for permitting aggregate assessment of damages has been called a question of law in that jurisdiction.​[120]​ Moreover, in the vast majority of those cases, the relevant courts have proceeded to certify the actions, on the basis that the methodology proposed by the representative claimant met the Pro-Sys standard.

	Various points arising in these post-Pro-Sys cases are directly relevant to Mastercard, viz:

(i)	The representative claimant is not expected to produce a methodology that proves that each and every class member suffered some loss because the overcharge was passed through to them. Rather, what is necessary is that the representative claimant’s proposed methodology must offer a reasonable prospect of establishing that overcharges have been passed through to the indirect purchaser level in the supply chain. Hence, if there is some prospect that some intermediaries in the supply chain (the retailers in Mastercard) may not have passed on overcharges for various reasons (e.g., to secure greater market share than their competitors), then that does not invalidate the claimant’s methodology which shows that the overcharge was likely passed on to some of those consumers. Any requirement that the methodology be able to demonstrate that every class member suffered harm was a misreading of Pro-Sys. What is more, it imposed an ‘unrealistic burden’ on the representative claimant (per Godfrey v Sony Corp​[121]​ and Fanshawe v Hitachi​[122]​).

	Reverting to the facts of Mastercard — was there a reasonable prospect of Mr Merricks’ proving some pass-through of the overcharge of the interchange fee to the consumers in the class action? In the EC infringement decision, it was said that some pass-through was ‘likely’, and that ‘depending on the competitive situation, merchants may increase the price for all goods sold [to the end-consumers, the class members] by a small margin rather than internalising the cost imposed on them by a MIF’.​[123]​ Additionally, the experts’ report in Mastercard noted that the level of pass-through from retailers to consumers was ‘likely to be high (50%–100%) and could have been fully passed-on’​[124]​ (although the diverging rates of pass-through across sectors was why an average weighted pass-through was contemplated). Furthermore, in the refusal of leave to appeal, the CAT noted:​[125]​ 

the Tribunal did not express any view [at the certification hearing] that there was no pass-through of damages by retailers to consumers. On the contrary, the Tribunal accepted that there may well be pass-through, but considered that the wide variation in potential pass-through as between different kinds of goods and services and different kinds of retail outlet made it impossible to determine pass-through as a common issue.

In the certification judgment, the CAT noted that Mastercard’s position, when sued by retailers, may have been that the overcharge was passed on by those retailers to end-consumers; but that did not preclude Mastercard from contending, in this case, that nothing was passed on to end-consumers (although ‘[t]he fact that Mastercard may have adopted a contrary position in other cases may of course be used by the Applicant forensically’).​[126]​

	On the basis of the EC’s infringement decision, the CAT’s own acknowledgement that it could not say that there was no pass-through, and on the basis of the experts’ report, the Pro-Sys standard — as interpreted and applied in Godfrey — has been met. 

(ii)	It has been said by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice that, in light of the Pro-Sys test, the need to show a ‘credible or plausible methodology’ for proving class-wide damage as certification poses a ‘low threshold’, and that ‘conflicting expert evidence is not to be given the level of scrutiny to which it would be subject at a trial’.​[127]​ 

	In Godfrey itself, the expert engaged by the representative claimant was dealing with a claim that the defendants Sony had participated in a global price-fixing cartel that raised the price British Columbians paid for optical disc drives and products containing such devices. The methodology which he proposed employed econometric and statistical methods based on multiple regression analysis, that would merely yield an average overcharge and average pass-through. In those circumstances, it was accepted that it would not be possible, using that methodology, to determine which class members were actually harmed and in what precise amount. Nevertheless, the action was certified, as the methodology (which accords closely with that used in by the representative claimant in Merricks v Mastercard) met the Pro-Sys standard.​[128]​ 

(iii)	Since the Pro-Sys decision was delivered, Canadian courts have been at pains to differentiate what is required under the Pro-Sys test at certification — as opposed to what may happen in the trial proper. It was well-explained by Perell J in Shah v LG Chem Ltd.​[129]​ This case concerned alleged price-fixing in the lithium-ion battery industry, and was certified when assessed against the Pro-Sys standard. In a passage approved in Godfrey,​[130]​ the certification stage was explained in this way: 

for the purposes of certification, the methodology about the existence of loss need only be shown to be a plausible one that the passing-on reached the indirect purchaser level of the distribution channel, and that there might be individual issues about whether any particular class member experienced illegal price-fixing. If the plaintiff’s expert’s methodology failed in proof at trial, then the class members’ claim would fail across the indirect class members’ class, because each and every one of them would have failed to prove a constituent element of their cause of action; i.e., that the price-fixing penetrated their place or ‘level’ of the distribution channel … Conversely, if the methodology proved sound to show that overcharges reached the indirect purchaser place in the distribution channel, then there might have to be individual issues trials to determine each class member’s entitlement. Or, if at trial the methodology to prove loss to the group was sound and a methodology for an aggregate assessment was also established, then the distribution mechanisms of [Ontario’s] Class Proceedings Act 1992 could be used to determine what is a fair and reasonable distribution, and it would not be necessary to have any individual issues trials.

Similarly, in Airia Brands v Air Canada​[131]​ (also certified), Leitch J put the position in these terms: 

It is not the function of the court on this [certification] motion to decide ... whether the regression analysis [proposed by the class representative] is possible. … while this analysis has been accepted in an American case, it may or may not be accepted at this common issues trial. ... The fact that the Defendants have a different theory of the case should not prevent the Plaintiffs from being able to proceed [to trial] with their theory of the case.

	Hence, in the Mastercard scenario, what precisely the VoC was for each of the years of the infringing period; and whether the pass-through rates from retailer to consumer were indeed different for different sectors of the UK economy over that period, and if so, what the weighted average should be for each of those years — all of that, and more, should properly be the subject of the trial. For that stage of proceedings, there will be a budget allocated to the provision of detailed expert evidence (one of the experts mentions the constraints of the budget available up to certification). However, at certification, the Canadian cases have made it plain that it would be wrong to put the representative claimant to proof on his methodology. The threshold is a low one, and in this case, it is suggested herein that the representative claimant’s methodology was ‘possible’ and ‘plausible’ and not merely ‘theoretical’. 

(iv)	Finally, what of the data set relied upon by the representative claimant? This has been a frequent point of contention in Canadian cases too — and, since Pro-Sys, the representative claimant has been treated fairly sympathetically in that regard. 

	In Fanshawe v Hitachi​[132]​ (a case concerning the alleged price-fixing of colour display tubes and components), again the action was certified, when considered against the Pro-Sys standard. All that the representative claimant’s expert attested was that, for his proposed multiple regression methodology, there was data available to allow for the calculation of the overcharge paid by direct purchasers, so as to measure the economic injury suffered on a class-wide basis at each subsequent level of the chain of distribution. The certification judge, Grace J, noted that the claimant’s expert relied on publicly available information, documents produced by defendants who had settled, and a redacted version of a declaration filed in US proceedings brought by indirect purchasers. Grace J remarked that, ‘[w]hile voluminous, that body of information is limited’ — yet that was not fatal to certification, precisely because disclosure was yet to come, together with the trial preparation stages:

The economist explained why he believed data was available that would allow him to calculate the overcharge paid by direct purchasers and measure the economic injury suffered on a class-wide basis at each subsequent level of the chain of distribution using a multiple regression analysis. The defendants attacked virtually every aspect of [the claimant’s expert’s] reports. In my view, certification is not the time or place for the kind of in depth critical review the defendants seek. ... this case is in its infancy. I emphasize production and oral discovery have not occurred. The exchange of affidavits and cross-examinations are not equivalent steps. ... certification is ‘a meaningful screening device’. It is not —and cannot be — equivalent to a trial based on a limited, though still humungous, written record. ... [the claimant’s expert’s] reports provide ‘some basis in fact’ to establish there was class-wide harm.​[133]​ 

In Watson v Bank of America Corp​[134]​ too, the British Columbia Court of Appeal accepted that, at certification, the evidence of the representative claimant’s expert ‘was not extensive on a method for establishing the extent of network effects, thereby to determine the harm occasioned by the impugned arrangement’ — but what was adduced was sufficient for certification, and constituted a ‘plausible methodology’ by which class-wide harm could be shown, given that clearly, the issue was to be a ‘battle of the experts’ which was better suited to trial. 

	In Mastercard, the experts ‘emphasised that this was a preliminary report and that more investigation and research would be required’, and reference was made to ‘published market studies’, ‘various competition authority decisions, such as the detailed reports on the groceries and motor fuel sectors’, the evidence filed by retailers from different sectors in their separate claims against Mastercard, and relevant reports prepared for the OFT.​[135]​ The CAT expected the representative claimant to ‘ascertain what data is reasonably available’​[136]​ — which is what the abovementioned list was intended to illustrate. What use can be made of that data is, as the Canadian cases demonstrate, for trial. As some Canadian commentators have remarked, Pro-Sys and its progeny show that the Canadian courts are ‘influenced by the degree of discovery (if any) that has occurred prior to the date of the certification hearing and are wary of holding plaintiffs to a higher standard in the absence of discovery.’​[137]​ It is contended that the situation should be similarly treated under the new UK regime.

(v)	In summary, these four points, in combination, demonstrate just how the CAT, in Mastercard, has ‘put the cart before the horse’ in many respects. It has sought too much of the representative claimant at certification, and in doing so, has mis-applied the Pro-Sys evidentiary standard. It may turn out that there were some consumers to whom the overcharged interchange fee was not passed on, but that should not preclude an aggregate assessment of damages or the methodology proposed for assessing that class-wide damages being permitted to proceed at certification. An average pass-through may be all that is possible to flag at certification, and the full data set for establishing that may only become available as the case proceeds to trial. That is the function of the trial, which occurs after disclosure and full evidentiary preparation. These matters are not to be decided at certification. On the basis of the Canadian cases which have applied the Pro-Sys standard, the Merricks v Mastercard methodology arguably did meet that evidentiary standard.

4.	No problem of ‘a million opt-outs’

It was the CAT’s focus on the individualised nature of damages in this case that gave rise to this further statement in the judgment: 

if, hypothetically, a million people opted out of the proceedings, there would be no proper way of reducing the quantum of damages accordingly (and, conversely, of increasing it if a large number of people now domiciled outside the UK sought to opt in): it would simply lead to everyone in the class getting more (or less) money out of the total pot.​[138]​

Two points should be made, to dissuade any concerns on this point. 

	First, it is not until the collective proceedings order is issued, following certification, that the date for opting out (or opting in, in the case of non-domiciled class members) will be set by the CAT.​[139]​ This will necessarily be prior to any award of judgment, as any judgment in a collective proceedings will be ‘binding on all represented persons’​[140]​ — and these are defined as those class members who have not (already) opted out.​[141]​ The sum of aggregate damages will be decided, not at certification, but at trial. Hence, by that point, the precise number of opt-outs will be ascertained, and the equation used to compute aggregate damages can be amended accordingly — always remembering that the calculation of aggregate damages is not by reference to an assessment of the individual losses suffered by the class members. The VoC figure was already forecast to be the subject of some necessary adjustment, should the matter proceed to trial​[142]​ — and in the very unlikely event that a million consumers opted out,​[143]​ some further adjustments would undoubtedly be necessary to that figure, but without reference to the precise losses which those particular one million consumers suffered.  

	Secondly, the prospect of opt-outs has not dissuaded either Canadian or US courts from certifying a class action to proceed, on the basis that the damages will be assessed in aggregate at the trial. In Ramdath v George Brown College of Applied Arts and Technology,​[144]​ some students who had enrolled in an allegedly defective educational programme had opted out of the class action (as they had found the programme to be valuable), and yet, an aggregate assessment of damages — in that case, for three separate sub-classes of students — was properly undertaken by the trial judge (said the Ontario Court of Appeal). In Trillium Motor World Ltd v General Motors of Canada Ltd,​[145]​ ultimately 30 car dealers opted out of the litigation brought against General Motors of Canada, and yet, the class action was certified on the basis that an aggregate assessment of damages could be certified as a common issue, and a measure of aggregate damages in the sum of $45 million was permitted at trial that properly reflected the loss to the class of remaining dealers. In neither case was an individualised approach to damages on the part of students or dealers, respectively, considered to be the correct approach to damages assessment, simply because opt-outs had actually manifested by the time that the trial was held. Moreover, in In re Worldcom Inc Securities Litig,​[146]​ the US District Court noted that, at the time of the calculation and award of aggregate damages at the trial proper, ‘[w]hile the number of opt outs can be determined at this time with more certainty, the existence of opt-outs does not, by itself, prevent an award of aggregate damages for the class.’

	Hence, in theory and in practice, the prospect of opt-outs does not — and should not — affect the decision at certification as to whether ‘the claims are suitable for an aggregate award of damages’.​[147]​ The CAT’s concerns on this point could not be sustained. 

	To summarise this section: it has been argued that an aggregate assessment of damages ought to have been permitted to go forth to trial, applying both the express language of s 47C(2) and the policy which underpins that sub-section (as evidenced by similar Canadian provisions). Furthermore, it has been contended that the evidentiary standard set by the Pro-Sys test is not meant to be unrealistically burdensome, and in light of the Canadian case law which has applied Pro-Sys since it was delivered in 2013, the methodology proposed by the representative claimant and his experts had sufficient basis in fact to meet the Pro-Sys threshold. 

E.	The second ‘problem’: distributing those damages

The other major problem with the Mastercard certification application, according to the CAT, was that the proposed method of distribution of the aggregate damages, a per-capita-distribution-on-an-annualised-basis’, ‘bore no relationship to the individual loss’.​[148]​ That would not satisfy the compensatory principle, in that consumers would not be restored to the position that they would have been in, had the interchange fees not been price-fixed.​[149]​ This is, of course, the measure of tortious damages​[150]​ — inevitably, given that breaches of competition law amount to the tort of breach of statutory duty. Some consumers might receive less compensation than they actually suffered by way of overcharged prices, and some might receive more. 

	However, it is contended that the CAT erred by insisting upon the application of the compensatory principle in Mastercard. This argument is teased out in four stages in this section. 

1.	The ‘compensatory principle’ is not statutorily mandated under the CA regime

By its very drafting, the new UK opt-out regime does not insist on any strict adherence to the compensatory principle. Quite the reverse. 

	Once an order for damages in opt-out proceedings is made, the CAT must then order that the damages be paid ‘on behalf of the represented persons’ to either the representative claimant or to some other party as the CAT thinks fit.​[151]​ The concept of ‘damages’ is expressed in the widest possible terms, to ‘include any sum of money which may be awarded by the Tribunal in collective proceedings (other than costs or expenses)’.​[152]​ Nothing in the drafting of that governing legislation requires adherence to the tortious measure of damages. 

	However, the situation is even plainer under the CAT Rules. When directing an assessment of the amount that may be claimed by individual represented persons out of the award of damages, Rule 92(2)(a) provides that the CAT’s direction may include ‘a method or formula by which such amounts are to be quantified’. This provision necessarily means that an assessment may not restore the class member to the position that he would have been in, had the price-fixing conduct not taken place. A defensible formula by which to estimate each class member’s loss, without reference to each class member’s actual compensatory loss, would be entirely acceptable and lawful.​[153]​

	As with the aggregate assessment provision in s 47C(2), these provisions are not unique — they have fairly similar precedent in Canadian jurisprudence, from which the CAT has itself drawn assistance in the first two certification decisions. Hence, it is useful to consider that Canadian precedent as a comparator, in order to demonstrate why the CAT’s concerns that the proposed method of distribution, a per-capita-distribution-on-an-annualised-basis, ‘bore no relationship to the individual loss’, and did not comply with the compensatory principle, were misplaced.

2. 	The ‘compensatory principle’ is not mandatory under North American statutory or judge-made class action jurisprudence either

Neither Canadian nor US law requires the payment of precise compensation to each class member for the loss suffered by each of them, to put them in the position as if the anti-competitive conduct had not occurred. That is most decidedly not a feature of either country’s jurisprudence. It is sufficient if the class members who are recipients of compensation receive a reasonably estimated assessment of their individual losses.

	In Canada, this position was eloquently put by the Ontario Law Reform Commission​[154]​ (by reference to earlier US judge-made law under FRCP 23​[155]​) in these terms: 

inaccuracies in distribution that are incidental to achieving a measure of redress for class members who would not otherwise receive monetary relief may be acceptable if the inaccuracies are not unreasonably great. The court’s primary concern with respect to inaccuracies should be the protection of class members against the depletion of their aggregate award by unfounded claims.​[156]​

That position was duly adopted by the Ontario Legislature. The Class Proceedings Act 1992 provides:

s 24(2)	The court may order that all or a part of an award [for aggregate assessment of damage] be applied so that some or all individual class members share in the award on an average or proportional basis.

(3)	In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (2), the court shall consider whether it would be impracticable or inefficient to identify the class members entitled to share in the award or to determine the exact shares that should be allocated to individual class members. 

Other Canadian provincial class action regimes followed suit with a similarly-worded provision.​[157]​ 

	Average or proportional distributions decidedly do not replicate the compensatory principle, but are a pragmatic compromise. Their application may approximate the loss actually suffered. They probably also constitute a substantive change to the law of damages quantification in Tort law, which is the principal reason as to why the class action regime in Ontario (and other Canadian common law provinces) is embodied in statute, rather than left to the sphere of a rules-making body which does not usually have the authority to amend the substantive law.​[158]​ Similarly, the UK reformers were always very alive to the fact that aspects of class actions jurisprudence could change the substantive law, and insisted that any such regime be enacted by statute​[159]​ (as it duly was).

	 A departure from the compensatory principle has also occurred in judge-made law under FRCP 23, where average or proportionate distributions across a class have been judicially awarded, or more commonly, the subject of judicially-approved settlements. For example, in In re Chicken Antitrust Litig American Poultry,​[160]​ one class in a settlement agreement received the average compensation which the other classes received — and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals approved this on the basis that it ‘seems to be a fair response to the particular difficulties that this class would have in gathering and presenting evidence of damages [and] ... because of a fear that the costs of gathering such proof would exceed the amount received [by each class member]’. The Southern District of New York also permitted equal distributions in Barr v WUI/TAS Inc,​[161]​ a price-fixing case involving subscribers to a telephone answering service: ‘[t]he reason for an equal distribution [amongst class members] within a region is that there is no method of determining the precise amount that any particular subscriber was overcharged. Thus, by an equal distribution, we are assured that each injured member will recover something.’ Some ‘generalized or formalory approach to the calculation of damages’ per class member was also endorsed in Shelter Realty Corp v Allied Maintenance Corp.​[162]​ The leading US treatise notes that, where individualised proof of the loss per class member ‘is not possible, per capita or average damage distribution may be made’.​[163]​

	Indeed, it was because some US courts​[164]​ had refused to certify class actions where only average or formulaic damages could be awarded to class members (on the basis that it would be unfair to the class members who could be under-compensated) that the OLRC strongly recommended the provisions which eventually became ss 24(2) and (3), reproduced above. The OLRC also considered​[165]​ that the perceptions of unfairness could be dealt with adequately by providing an opportunity, under the legislation, for class members to opt out of the average, proportionate or formulaic distribution and prove their claims individually, if they had the evidence to support that. Ultimately, the Ontario Legislature did not adopt that particular recommendation (although, some years later, the British Columbia Legislature​[166]​ and other provinces​[167]​ did so). Nevertheless, providing an opportunity for individual class members to by-pass the average or proportional assessment of their individual loss appears to address the concerns about unfairness to class members (a concern raised by commentators in US jurisprudence since FRCP 23 was enacted​[168]​ — e.g., in the context of class-wide back pay formulas in discrimination cases​[169]​). The CA regime does not expressly provide that individual class members can by-pass ‘the method or formula’ which the CAT settles on, but presumably that could also be directed by the CAT.

	Alternatively, is a departure from the compensatory principle unfair to the defendant? The OLRC concluded that it could not be, on the basis of the following reasoning: once an aggregate award of damages is made, then the class members ‘should be treated as being, in essence, the owners of the fund thus created’, and where the defendant ‘will already have had a full opportunity to litigate the fact and extent of his liability to class members in adversarial proceedings. The defendant’s aggregate liability cannot be further increased by the distribution proceedings.’​[170]​ Hence, it is not for the defendant to ‘impeach the aggregate award’ because of how it is distributed. The defendant’s interest in that fund dissipates after the contest about aggregate liability has concluded. Rather, ‘[t]he appropriateness of any particular distribution scheme should be evaluated in terms of whether it is in the class members’ interests’, and making sure that unfounded claims are not dissipating the damages pot. Finally, if some class members do not come forward to claim their individual damages, then any reversionary distribution back to the wrongdoing defendant, after all the ‘compensatory’ distributions have been completed, ‘should be irrelevant’.​[171]​  

	This early law reform opinion has since been borne out in practice. US case law​[172]​ (and academic commentary​[173]​) has reiterated that how a damages pot created by an aggregate assessment is distributed is not for the defendant to seek to impeach. In Six (6) Mexican Workers v Arizona Citrus Growers,​[174]​ the Ninth Circuit held that ‘where the only question is how to distribute the damages, the interests affected are not the defendant’s but rather those of the silent class members.’ Canadian case law has taken the same approach — that ‘the participation of the defendants would not be required beyond the common issues trial’;​[175]​ and ‘[a]fter an aggregate assessment, the defendant will not be paying more than he or she would pay had the individual class members’ claims been calculated after individual issues trials, and, thus, the defendant should be indifferent as to how the court decides to divide the aggregate assessment.’​[176]​

	Hence, to summarise: individual distributions to class members which do not reflect the actual loss suffered by each class member are statutorily endorsed in Canada and are judicially-authorised in the United States. Any suggestions that such distributions are unfair to either the class members or the defendant have been rebutted as a general principle of law. Provided that the distribution achieves a substantial measure of compensation for each class member, that has been legally sufficient in those class actions jurisdictions. 

	This leads to the next point: was the particular formula proposed by Mr Merricks — a ‘per capita distribution on an annualised basis — defensible? Canadian jurisprudence, in particular, suggests that it was, as discussed in the following section. 

3.	Equivalent solutions exist in Canadian jurisprudence

(a)	Departures from the compensatory principle 

The fact that a Canadian court may distribute an aggregate award among class members ‘on an average or proportional basis’ has provided courts with ‘considerable flexibility’, according to Cumming J, one of the original certification judges in Ontario.​[177]​ It has also been judicially acknowledged that the latitude provided by the Canadian provision allows a distribution of damages to class members, even where some class members have not proven that they suffered harm at all​[178]​ — again, a significant departure from the compensatory principle.

	The Canadian provision has been oft-utilised in unauthorised overcharge cases. In Gilbert v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce,​[179]​ consumers who used Visa cards alleged that they had been charged unauthorised and undisclosed fees in respect of debits and credits on the defendant’s Visa account in a foreign currency. CIBC agreed to pay $16.5 million to settle the claims. There was no attempt to identify those members of the class who had actually used their Visa cards to conduct transactions in foreign currency. Winkler RSJ approved the settlement agreement. He remarked that the distribution of the aggregate damages sum meant that an amount of between $0.72 and $14.32 was to be paid to cardholders — a distribution which ‘does not purport to reflect the actual transactions of each cardholder. ... These amounts are arbitrary and minor in amount. They do not purport to compensate class members in terms of actual amounts owing nor do they compensate only class members with valid claims. The bank justifies this scheme by stating that records are not available for a significant portion of the period in question and for periods when records are available the transactional analysis would simply be too costly and time consuming given the number and size of transactions.’​[180]​ It was for precisely that scenario that the ‘average or proportional’ leeway was provided. In Cassano v Toronto-Dominion Bank,​[181]​ the Ontario Court of Appeal also exhorted that the trial judge ‘may find it possible to resort to s 24(2) in order to fashion a remedial order that avoids potential costs and inefficiencies that might arise from an attempt to determine the quantum of damages on an individual basis.’

	The possibility of a pro rata or average share of the aggregate damages award, which did not match the actual loss sustained by the class members, was also approved in the entirely different scenarios of the alleged infringement of fishing rights asserted by aboriginal collectives;​[182]​ and a dispute between franchisees and franchisor about withheld rebates.​[183]​  





To reiterate, the formula for distribution of the damages to class members in Mastercard was to divide the aggregate assessment on an equal, per capita basis among all the members of the class for that year (i.e., all who were resident in the UK and >16 in that year). On that basis too, Canadian jurisprudence shows that a similar formula has been capable of being certified. 

	In Eidoo v Infineon Technologies AG,​[184]​ the Ontario Superior Court of Justice remarked that Ontario’s class actions statute contemplated that distribution schemes ‘may differentiate between class members, who do not all have to receive the same allocation of the settlement proceeds’ and that, ‘it may be appropriate to distribute the judgment or the settlement funds per capita, dividing the fund by the number of class members’. This case approved of the ‘Distribution Protocol’ for the Canadian DRAM National Class Action.

	The Canadian Corrugated Material Class Actions National Settlement Agreement, which was certified and approved in Quebec, British Columbia and Ontario,​[185]​ showed a similar flexibility. One fund allocated to the sub-class who purchased corrugated material directly from the defendants was permitted to paid on a pro rata basis, based on the dollar value of corrugated material purchased, with linerboard being valued at twice the level of other corrugated material. Another fund, allocated to large-scale purchasers from one or more non-defendants, was paid out on a per capita (equal) basis.

	In neither case was proof of the actual loss sustained by the eligible class members required — and, of course, the compensatory principle was not adhered to either. These cases are instructive, as persuasive indicators of what should be permissible under the CA regime, where a ‘method or formula’ for quantification of damages is legislatively permitted. 

4.	Any inability to distribute the damages triggers a cy-près distribution

A final reckoning for the compensatory principle under the CA regime is that Parliament itself did not expect it to apply — by implementing a cy-près recipient, in the event that there was an undistributed residue of the aggregate damages.  

	Pursuant to s 47C(5), where the CAT ‘makes an award of damages in opt-out collective proceedings, any damages not claimed by the represented persons within a specified period must be paid to the charity for the time being prescribed by order made by the Lord Chancellor under s 194(8) of the Legal Services Act 2007.’ The only charity prescribed to date is the Access to Justice Foundation.​[186]​ This is a unique aspect of the UK’s CA regime, and certainly one that distinguishes it from its Canadian and US forebears. Whilst cy-près distributions of undistributed residue are a common feature of North American class actions jurisprudence,​[187]​ the UK statute is unusual. Where a judgment is in the representative claimant’s favour and an undistributed residue of aggregate damages remains, the Foundation is the only cy-près destination possible​[188]​ — but in the case of a settlement, the unclaimed sum can be paid to any destination which forms part of the judicially-approved settlement, including cy-près entities, and reversionary payments to the defendant.​[189]​ 

	All of this belies the CAT’s concern that, ‘[t]he governing principle of damages for breach of competition law is restoration of the claimants to the position they would have been in but for the breach’, and that ‘this application for over 46 million claims to be pursued by collective proceedings would not result in damages being paid to those claimants in accordance with that governing principle at all’.​[190]​ The damages awarded in Mastercard do not have to be paid in accordance with that ‘governing principle’ — because Parliament has already decreed that cy-près principles can properly apply under the regime. That inevitably means that some recipient of cy-près compensation may not have been harmed at all, whilst others that were harmed will not be beneficiaries of the cy-près distribution. It all depends on the degree of overlap between the class action class and the cy-près class, and whether the cy-près beneficiary is selected to be ‘as near as’, or ‘the next best’ recipient for the monies. Whilst these intricacies of cy-près scholarship lie outside the scope of this article,​[191]​ the relevant point is that statutorily-authorised cy-près distributions must be a departure from the compensatory principle which the CAT articulated. On that basis too, the CAT’s adherence to the principle was legally flawed. 

F. 	A right without a remedy

Quite apart from the problems with the CAT’s analysis of the certification criteria already examined, it is important to consider a more holistic issue arising from the litigation in Mastercard thus far. Via its implementation of the CA regime, the UK Parliament purposefully created a right of action for private consumers (and others) against defendants that had engaged in anti-competitive conduct. However, by denying both a collective proceedings order, and the representative claimant’s application to appeal, the CAT has effectively assumed control unto itself of the development of this emerging and novel jurisprudence. This outcome is concerning, for three reasons: (1) the position is at odds with the important role which appellate overview has played in early jurisprudence under class actions regimes elsewhere; (2) in denying the representative claimant the right of appeal, the CAT has arguably misinterpreted the express provisions of the CA regime; and (3) constitutional principles relating to the judicial overview of Tribunal decisions also signify a necessary appeal in this seminal class action. Dealing with each in turn: 

1.	The role of appellate overview  

In any new class actions regime, there will be key words and phrases upon which entire cases will turn. It is up to the courts to ‘put judicial flesh on those statutory bones’. History has shown that appellate courts have played a very important role in setting class actions statutes on paths of interpretation which have ramifications, decades later.

	Within seven years of FRCP 23 being implemented, the US Supreme Court had to decide, in American Pipe and Construction Co v Utah,​[192]​ that the statute of limitations against putative class members had not been tolled by the filing of a class action on their behalf, in circumstances where certification ultimately failed;​[193]​ and also had to rule, in the famous litigation in Eisen v Carlisle and Jacquelin,​[194]​ on what ‘the best notice practicable under the circumstances’​[195]​ meant in the US class action rule. In both cases, the original District Court rulings had been the opposite from which the relevant Supreme Courts ultimately decided.​[196]​ Moreover, in one of the earliest appeals instituted under FRCP 23, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court below, ruling that punitive damages were not authorized in certain securities class actions. In their judgment, the Court of Appeals acknowledged their role in having to decide a ‘serious and troublesome question ... of great importance’ to the future efficacy and utility of the class action procedure.​[197]​ 

The CAT justified its denial of leave to appeal certification on the basis that the Government wished to ‘craft an effective system of collective redress for the UK’, without the appellate litigation ‘typically’ seen with the US and Canadian class actions certification decisions, and to ‘preclude prolonged litigation’ in collective proceedings.​[198]​ However, such concerns must be balanced against the judicial rigour which was applied to key statutory phrases in Eisen, American Pipe and Wong during the early life of FRCP 23. It is impossible now to imagine US class actions procedure without them. The right of appeal was also brought into sharp relief under FRCP 23 when, on 1 December 1998, FRCP 23(f) as inserted, permitting ‘an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying class action certification’ in certain circumstances.​[199]​ In Blair v Equifax Check Services Inc,​[200]​ the Seventh Circuit judicially considered the reasons as to why this discretionary right of interlocutory appeal was promulgated. One, in particular, speaks with relevance to the Mastercard scenario: ‘an appeal may facilitate the development of the law. Because a large proportion of class actions settle or are resolved in a way that overtakes procedural matters, some fundamental issues about class actions are poorly developed. ... the justification for interlocutory review is contributing to development of the law’.​[201]​

Notably, the pattern of important appellate overview has been evident early in the lives of other class actions regimes too. Take Australia’s federal class action, for example. The claimant there has to prove the existence of a ‘substantial’ common issue, in order to prosecute the claim in class action form.​[202]​ That single word entailed a great deal of controversy in the early days of Australia’s jurisprudence.​[203]​ Within seven years of the regime taking effect, it was eventually interpreted by the High Court of Australia, in Wong v Silkfield Pty Ltd, to mean an issue which was not ‘ephemeral or nominal’; one which was ‘real or of substance’.​[204]​ It did not require that the common issues had predominance over the individual issues on a numerical basis;​[205]​ or that a common issue could resolve the claims of the class members once and for all, or that the common issue would have a ‘major impact on the litigation’;​[206]​ or that the common issue would advance the determination of liability across multiple causes of action​[207]​ — all of which had been upheld in lower federal court decisions.​[208]​

	In light of this background, it is rather odd that key words and phrases of the CA regime should not be permitted to become the subject of appellate review. This preclusion is out of step with historical developments elsewhere, where such reviews have often set the law on an entirely different path than that which lower courts had decreed. Judicial efficiency at the expense of accuracy and correctness should not be permitteed in any legal system, particularly in a new procedural regime as important as this one.

2. 	The express provisions of the CA regime

Turning now from the wider context to the CA regime itself, Parliament explicitly authorised appeals from the CAT’s judgments in these terms (‘the appeal provision’):

An appeal lies to the appropriate court on a point of law arising from a decision of the Tribunal ... in collective proceedings —

(a) as to the award of damages or other sum (other than a decision on costs or expenses) ...​[209]​

Under this provision, the ‘appropriate court’ is the Court of Appeal.​[210]​

	It follows that there are two pre-requisites for a right of appeal arising under the appeal provision. First, the appeal must concern ‘a point of law’, and secondly, the CAT’s decision must relate to ‘an award of damages’. Arguably, both criteria were met in Mastercard.  

The phrase, a ‘point of law’, is not defined in either the CA regime or elsewhere in UK statute.​[211]​ Hence, it must be given its natural and ordinary meaning, i.e., a scenario which involves the application of legal principles to the facts at hand. Although the CAT considered that the questions of assessment and distribution of damages in Mastercard did not give rise to questions of law,​[212]​ the contrary position is put herein, given that the CAT’s decision involved whether the aggregate assessment of damages provision in the CA regime (a statutory initiative which arguably entails a change to the substantive law of damages computation​[213]​) could be properly engaged, and if so, how that assessment was to be undertaken. The CAT measured the value of a class suit solely in terms of whether restorative damages could be feasibly awarded, as would have applied, had the class members sued individually. But the motivating purpose of the CA regime is vitally different from unitary litigation. These forms of collective proceeding are meant to afford some recourse to individuals whose claims are small in each instance, but substantial when taken together. This is why Canadian and US courts have long understood that aggregate damages are the best means of calculating damages in these class actions, and why issues of individual damage calculation should be addressed after certification. Whether the same policy applies under the CA regime is an important question of law, and was squarely posed by the scenario in Mastercard. 

Indeed, the differentiation between a right of prospective class members to proceed with claims as a collective proceeding, and a ruling as to whether those claims will ultimately succeed and result in a recovery, is crucial to the certification hearing, in the authors’ view. The first-mentioned concerns the procedural avenue provided by the CA regime to join widespread negative value claims in a collective proceeding, which is the proper subject of a certification analysis. The second-mentioned concerns the remedy for demonstrated consumer protection violations through some form of recovery for or on behalf of the class, which is the proper subject of a trial. By refusing certification in Mastercard, that outcome denied the procedural avenue in the first instance, which then in turn precluded any possibility of a substantive recovery for Mastercard’s proven infringement. As Parts D and E earlier explain, the purported existence of individuated damages issues cannot properly be invoked as a means of summarily forestalling the procedural mechanism by which the defendant’s conduct may be evaluated and, in appropriate cases, remedied.

	Furthermore, the appealable decision must be ‘as to the award of damages or other sum’. The CAT concluded that the refusal of a certification order was not a decision that fell within that phrase — rather, ‘it is a decision that the proposed manner of pursuing in combination claims, which may in themselves be valid claims for damages, should not be permitted’ because the criteria for certification had not been permitted.​[214]​ Hence, the CAT cast its decision as being of a solely procedural nature. Denial of certification was only directed to how the class members’ claims for damages could be brought. Three pertinent points may be made here. 

	First, the importance of any certification decision which has the effect of precluding any further litigation cannot be overstated. Indeed, that was a key reason that the discretionary right of appeal in FRCP 23(f) was implemented in 1998. According to the accompanying Advisory Committee Note, ‘[p]ermission [to appeal] is most likely to be granted when the certification decision turns on a novel or unsettled question of law, or when, as a practical matter, the decision of certification is likely dispositive of the litigation.’​[215]​ Similarly, it is inconceivable that any of the consumers in Mastercard will take individual action against Mastercard, or utilise the opt-in group action procedure,​[216]​ given the very small sums individually at stake, and given the risks that arise for those class members in a costs-shifting landscape. Refusal of certification in Mastercard was indeed a denial of damages ‘as a practical matter’. Secondly, the award of damages being sought in Mastercard was an aggregate award — and the CAT ruled that such an award was not feasible. Hence, on the very wording in the appeal provision, the CAT’s refusal to certify was a decision that was made ‘as to an award of damages’. Thirdly, just as with the opt-out class action, the CAT’s jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief was newly-granted under the CA regime.​[217]​ In expanding the CAT’s jurisdiction in that regard, the Government stated, in its response to the Consultation Document, that, ‘[a]s regards the appropriateness of the CAT, a tribunal, being able to grant injunctions, the Government notes that ... the fact that the CAT’s decisions are appealable to the Court of Appeal (in relation to CAT proceedings in England and Wales) ... mean that the CAT is an appropriate body to be given the ability to grant injunctions.’​[218]​ A similar philosophy was surely intended by the Government when imbuing upon the CAT a brand new jurisdiction to adjudicate opt-out class actions. Far from the CAT’s assertion that, had an appeal against a certification order been allowed, then the legislature would have expressly stated that,​[219]​ the authors believe the converse to be true: that had the Government intended certification orders to be unappealable, then it would have expressly stated that in the governing legislation. 

3. 	Respecting constitutional principles

Unless the forthcoming dual application for judicial review/permission to appeal succeeds,​[220]​ the CAT’s refusal to grant permission to appeal leaves the claimant class in the position of possessing a legal right under the CA regime but without any legal remedy. And, as Holt CJ stated in Ashby v White, ‘[i]f the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain it, … indeed it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy. … Where a man has but one remedy to come at his right, if he loses that he loses his right.’​[221]​  

The CA regime is the legislative response in the UK to an issue of social policy: how to protect individual consumers from widespread but diffuse economic harm. Indeed, the CAT expressly acknowledged the importance of opt-out class actions as a parliamentary innovation that is meant to improve access to social justice and enhance consumer protection as a matter of public policy: ‘[t]he introduction of collective proceedings on an opt-out basis for violations of competition law also amounts to legislation in the field of social or economic policy.’​[222]​ By denying the claimant leave to appeal, the CAT has effectively deprived the Court of Appeal of its constitutional and statutory authority to review the CAT’s judgment. This follows from the appellate authority which has repeatedly held that the content and scope of individual rights must ultimately be established by a court, and that legislation will be interpreted on that presumption:​[223]​

[W]here Parliament confers on an administrative tribunal or authority, as distinct from a court of law, power to decide particular questions defined by the Act conferring the power, Parliament intends to confine that power to answering the question as it has been so defined: and if there has been any doubt as to what that question is, this is a matter for courts of law to resolve in fulfilment of their constitutional role as interpreters of the written law and expounders of the common law and rules of equity.

	By providing a right of appeal from the CAT to the Court of Appeal, Parliament ensured that basic principle of good administration should be followed in the implementation of the new collective proceedings regime. Academic scholars have helpfully expanded upon why this general principle should apply. For example, Morgan points out that the salutary inclusion of the courts in the implementation and development of economic policy (of which, as noted above, the CAT accepts that the CA regime is an example) helps to ensure that the administrative tribunal remains accountable to its legislative remit and to the public who are meant to be protected by the parliamentary initiative, while also ensuring that policy will develop in accordance with governing legal norms and concepts.​[224]​ Wade and Forsyth justify the principle thus: ‘[w]here statute gives a right of appeal from a tribunal to a court of law, it is usually confined to a right of appeal on a point of law. … It is of great importance that it should be generally available, so that the courts may give guidance on the proper interpretation of the law. … It is through appeals that the courts and the tribunals are kept in touch, so that the tribunals are integrated into the machinery of justice.’​[225]​ As Richardson has also explained, the relationship between the rights of individuals and the review of determinations of their rights by courts is itself constitutive of the rule of law, in that tribunals ‘are not courts and are specifically designed to be different from courts. However, they are now widely regarded as forming part of the judicial arm of government and they are empowered to make binding interpretations of the law that can affect the rights and obligations of individuals. The basic doctrine of the rule of law would therefore suggest that they should be answerable to the courts for the way in which they interpret and apply the law. Thus, appeal should lie to the ordinary courts from the decisions of tribunals, at least on point of law.’​[226]​

Consistent with this commitment to the rule of law, Parliament intended and allowed for appeal of the CAT’s judgments on points of law arising under the CA regime — and it is strongly arguable that the denial of the application to appeal in Mastercard has infringed this principle.

G.   	Conclusion

The first ream of cases decided under the CA regime were always going to be very important for the future efficacy and utility of the new opt-out procedure, and for any ‘roll-out’ of the opt-out concept to other sectors (given the UK Government’s preference for sectoral, rather than generic, reform in this area​[227]​). In the authors’ view, the Mastercard decision contains some concerning precedential points which, if unreviewed, will hamper the regime for years to come. 

	It has been suggested that insufficient weight was given to CAT r 79(2)(g), as to whether ‘any other means of resolving the dispute’ existed. It has also been argued that insufficient regard was had to the very aims and purposes of the CA regime which were discussed in preceding Government papers and contemporaneous Hansard statements. 

	Even more importantly, the CAT’s refusal to certify the Mastercard action on the basis that no sustainable methodology could be applied in practice to calculate aggregate damages across the defined class of victims of the price-fixing implemented by Mastercard involved important points of legal precedent. Arguably, insufficient regard was had to the explicit terms and the policy intent underpinning s 47C(2). Additionally, the CAT arguably ought to have made allowance for a reasonable degree of accuracy of the aggregate assessment, rather than visualising this claim as a series of aggregated individual claims. Canadian precedent provides instructive and persuasive jurisprudence on that very point. Moreover, the CAT’s conclusion that the representative claimant’s methodology for proving aggregate damages did not meet the Pro-Sys evidentiary standard was arguably incorrect, when one considers several of the Canadian cases, post-Pro-Sys, which have applied that test. Finally, on this point, the CAT’s concern about the effect on aggregate damages of ‘a million opt-outs’ cannot be legally substantiated either. 

	The remaining ground for refusal of certification was that there was no reasonable or practicable means of estimating the individual loss per class member to enable any aggregate damages to be distributed to the class members. This conclusion turned on the CAT’s adherence to the ‘compensatory principle’. However, that principle does not govern the ‘return’ which is achievable for class members under the CA regime, as a matter of law. The terms of r 92(2)(a) are not necessarily compatible with the compensatory principle, permitting, as they do, a ‘method or formula’ by which individual damages may be assessed. That ‘method or formula’ may restore each class member precisely to the position in which he would have been, but for the defendant’s infringing behavior — or it may not. Moreover, Canadian and US precedent has refuted the compensatory principle strongly, on the basis that any departure from it neither harms the class members nor the defendant. Per capita distributions of the type proposed by the representative claimant have been upheld in Canadian jurisprudence, under the equivalent provisions contained in their provincial class actions statutes. Finally, the fact that the UK Parliament endorsed the possibility of a cy-près distribution explicitly refutes any compensatory principle under the CA regime. By virtue of that endorsement, some unharmed persons may be recipients of the cy-près distribution to the Access to Justice Foundation, whilst some of those harmed may miss out on any benefit from that distribution whatsoever. Such is the potential ramification of any cy-près distribution.  

	Hence, for the abovementioned reasons, the authors consider that the Mastercard certification decision warrants further judicial consideration, whether by the Court of Appeal (should jurisdiction for such an appeal exist, as argued for in Section F) or by the Administrative Court by way of judicial review. 
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